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I. Introduction
The uptake of health care services in developing countries is low, even for simple cost-effective technologies (Kremer and Glennerster 2011). This study explores whether we can use ﬁnancial incentives to raise the uptake of health care
services by traditionally disadvantaged groups. Unequal access and uptake of
health care services is a major problem in both developed and developing countries (Braveman and Tarimo 2002). Outreach workers are often used to solve the
problem of low access. The expectation from policy makers is that outreach workers would reach individuals who would not otherwise access services. However,
the advantaged groups are often overrepresented in the health workforce (Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality 2014; Snyder et al. 2015). Literature in
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sociology suggests that individuals ﬁnd it easier to reach out to others like themselves (Barnes-Mauthe et al. 2013). If the advantaged groups reach out primarily
to their own groups, inequality could be worsened by the existing outreach efforts;
more individuals from advantaged groups would access services with only a small
increase, if any, in the number of individuals from disadvantaged groups. Therefore,
in order to improve access for disadvantaged groups and thus address inequality in
general, it is important to ﬁnd a mechanism to encourage outreach workers to reach
out to those from disadvantaged groups.
In this study, we attempt to answer two research questions. First, can we incentivize health outreach workers to refer individuals from disadvantaged groups
through differential incentives favoring recruitment from the disadvantaged
groups? Second, on the demand side, does providing ﬁnancial incentives directly
to disadvantaged clients encourage them to utilize health care services?
To answer these questions, we recruited health volunteers within a geographic
region in a semiurban district in Nepal, randomized them into four arms, provided
them with basic training on diabetes, and asked them to recruit clients from the
community for a free sugar level assessment at their local health center. Across
four arms, we varied the amount of ﬁnancial incentives that the health volunteers
received. Speciﬁcally, in the Low and High arms, the amount of incentive did not
depend on the type of the referral. In the two remaining arms, the amount depended on the ethnicity of the client the health volunteers recruited—in one
of these arms, we offered a higher amount for recruiting a client from their own
ethnicity, whereas in the other arm, we offered a higher amount for recruiting
a client from a different ethnicity. This resulted in two sets of differential incentives: one targeted toward referring disadvantaged clients (NudgeDis) and another targeted toward referring advantaged clients (NudgeAdv). This setup allowed us to test whether different incentives for health volunteers inﬂuence the
likelihood of a disadvantaged client being referred.
We included a second level of randomization in which we varied the amount
of ﬁnancial incentives provided directly to the clients. For disadvantaged clients
to increase their uptake of health services on the basis of a health worker’s persuasion, they should be receptive to the health worker’s message. It is possible
for the clients not to act on the health worker’s suggestion, even after the health
worker provides a referral. By randomizing incentives received by clients for
showing up for a checkup, we are able to assess whether incentives can help offset
the barriers faced by prospective disadvantaged patients in coming to the checkup
once a health volunteer refers them.
To preview the results, we ﬁnd that our differential incentive in the ratio of
2.5∶1, geared toward encouraging a disadvantaged referral, raises the chances
of such a referral by 11.6 percentage points (95% conﬁdence interval [CI],
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1.1–22.1). This effect translates to an incentive elasticity of referral of about
0.2. The proportion of disadvantaged individuals referred by health volunteers
at baseline is 43%, which is lower than their population share of 56%. The
incentives geared toward disadvantaged referral thus raise disadvantaged referrals to approximately 55%, roughly equal to their share in the population. The
increased share of disadvantaged referrals does not come at a cost of reduced
overall referrals; nor do the health volunteers refer less sick patients to beneﬁt
from the incentive. The increased chances of a disadvantaged referral is due to
disadvantaged health volunteers referring more of their own type in response to
the differential incentives rather than the advantaged health volunteers referring
more of the disadvantaged clients. We ﬁnd that there is no difference in the
proportion of disadvantaged referrals between advantaged and disadvantaged
health volunteers at baseline, which suggests that disadvantaged health volunteers are no more likely to target their own group than advantaged health volunteers are, if there were no incentives. Hiring more disadvantaged health volunteers
and providing them a differential incentive geared toward a disadvantaged referral
may be the most effective way to raise the uptake of preventive health services by
the disadvantaged groups.
On the demand side, conversely, we ﬁnd no evidence that a ﬁnancial incentive provided directly to a disadvantaged individual raises the uptake of preventive health services. Conditional on being referred by a health volunteer, the
disadvantaged clients are less likely to come to a health center for a checkup
than are advantaged clients. However, ﬁnancial incentives do not sufﬁciently
offset the barriers they face.
Our study contributes to the broad body of literature that centers on incentivizing public service workers to improve their performance in prosocial tasks.
In the context of our study, the public service workers are the health volunteers,
and the measure of prosocial task is whether they reach out to individuals from
traditionally disadvantaged groups. To date, researchers have focused on the
roles of ﬁnancial incentives on hiring and keeping capable agents who work
for public programs to help public good provision, often testing them against
the effects of nonﬁnancial incentives (for a review of these studies, see Finan et al.
2017). However, evidence on the effect of ﬁnancial incentives on public workers
has been substantially limited, with mixed ﬁndings. For example, Dal Bo et al.
(2013) study a recruitment drive for public sector positions in Mexico and conclude that higher wages help attract a better candidate pool in terms of both quality and motivation. In other words, ﬁnancial incentives to public service workers
do not have adverse selection effects in terms of public service motivation. Conversely, using a ﬁeld experiment among candidates for a health promoter position
in Uganda, Deserranno (2019) ﬁnds that stronger ﬁnancial incentives discourage
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applications from agents with strong prosocial preferences, showing that ﬁnancial
incentives can crowd out prosocial motivation.
Relatively fewer studies have documented the role of incentives on health
workers. Ashraf et al. (2014) conducted an experiment in Zambia that was designed to compare the effects of monetary and nonmonetary incentives on the
performance of workers in a public health organization to promote human
immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV) prevention. They ﬁnd that nonﬁnancial rewards
are effective in delivering health services and that the effect of both nonﬁnancial
and ﬁnancial rewards is stronger for prosocially motivated workers. Their study
is informative in evaluating the effect of extrinsic rewards on the performance of
health agents. However, the study provides little insights about whether these
incentives could encourage health workers to reach out more to those from disadvantaged groups and address inequality in general. In other words, the extent
of the effect of ﬁnancial incentives on outreach effort—and thus health care utilization by disadvantaged groups—vis-à-vis multiethnic interactions is poorly
understood in the literature. This is an important omission, given the centrality
of outreach efforts in improving access and utilization and the need for health
workers to interact frequently with individuals from different backgrounds than
their own.
A recent exception is Berg et al. (2017). They study the impact of social
distance between agent and beneﬁciary household across the caste hierarchy in
India, documenting whether incentive pay could alleviate the negative consequences of the tendency to favor interaction with one’s own groups. They ﬁnd
that putting agents on incentive pay contracts increases knowledge transmission
and enrollment of cross groups by cancelling the negative effect of social distance.
They ﬁnd this result to be symmetric, in the sense that it holds whether the agent
is from a high- or low-status caste group. They suggest that a likely mechanism is
a reallocation of time spent toward cross-group households at the expense of one’s
own group.
While both the work of Berg et al. (2017) and our study involve the use of
ﬁnancial incentives to offset barriers to health care utilization, there are two
key differences, which also highlight our key contributions to the literature. First,
the incentive pay in Berg et al. is based on the results of the knowledge test among
a group of randomly selected households, which was used to identify how well the
knowledge was conveyed from agents to households. In our experiment, the incentive is directly attached to the type of clients referred by the health volunteers,
and the performance is measured by the number of clients who were referred and
showed up at the clinic. In that sense, our indicators measure outreach effort
made by health volunteers more directly. On the basis of the difference between
who is referred and who comes to the health center, we are also able to comment
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on the extent to which efforts from health volunteers translate to actual utilization
of health services by disadvantaged groups. In Berg et al.’s study, the incentive
pay incentivizes the agent to put in general effort toward improving the knowledge of their villagers. In our study, the health volunteer is incentivized to reach a
speciﬁc type of client. By design, we thus cater more directly to the targeting of
disadvantaged groups.
Second, Berg et al. explore whether incentive pay alleviates the negative consequences of social distance from the perspective of the health workers only. In
our experiment, we add a second layer of experiment by varying the amount of
ﬁnancial incentives offered to clients. This allows us to examine the effect of
incentives on barriers the clients face and the effectiveness of both supply- and
demand-side incentives in the utilization of health services. Most existing studies
have exclusively focused on incentivizing the supply side, or public agents, and
measured the effects of incentives on their performance to reach out to the public. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study that brings together the two types of
incentives as a way to raise the uptake of health care services by traditionally disadvantaged groups.
II. The Study Setting
We conducted this experiment in Nepal, which is an appropriate place to study
health care utilization and ethnic barriers for two main reasons. First, the prevalence of health disparities between ethnic groups and the low uptake of preventive health services has been persistent in Nepal. Speciﬁcally, signiﬁcant disparities exist in both access to health care services and health outcomes between
ethnic groups (Pandey et al. 2013). Second, the prevalence of diabetes, the
medical condition of interest in this study, is rapidly rising in Nepal, with the
current prevalence at 9.1% (World Health Organization 2016).
The Nepalese government has categorized the country’s more than 100 ethnicities into six main categories based on religion, caste, and ethnicity: Brahmin/Chhetri, Newar, Muslim, Madhesi, Janajati, and Dalit. They have been further categorized into advantaged and disadvantaged groups based on historical
access to resources. Brahmin/Chhetri and Newar are considered advantaged,
while the rest are considered disadvantaged. In this study, we use these two broad
categories. Although there are within-category differences—in both access and
outcomes—they are more pronounced between these categories (Pandey et al.
2013). An improvement in the health status of individuals from the disadvantaged group would help raise the overall health status of the population signiﬁcantly. From a practical perspective, it would be easier to target a policy intervention to the disadvantaged group in general rather than a subgroup within it.
Therefore, the categorization used in this study also has a political appeal. Not
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surprisingly, other studies have also used this categorization as a basis for ethnicity
(e.g., Mishra, Joshi, and Khanal 2014).
The level of social interaction between the groups depends on the type of
activity. They share the same schools and health facilities. However, marrying
across ethnic lines is uncommon, and Dalits in particular continue to be barred
from sharing water facilities and from religious sites (although such restrictions
are now illegal).
The subjects in this study are the Female Community Health Volunteers
(health volunteers) in a semiurban area in western Nepal and the clients they recruited for a free sugar level assessment. The government created the health volunteers in 1989 initially to help administer vitamin A supplements to children.
There are nearly 48,000 health volunteers, all female, in the country (Andersen
et al. 2013). The health volunteers are primarily tasked to create awareness about
available health services and to encourage individuals in their community to utilize those services. Over the years, the health volunteers’ role has expanded signiﬁcantly, and they have been praised in the international development community for their success in reducing child and maternal mortality (Center for Global
Development 2011). On the basis of the country’s past experience in reducing
child and maternal mortality, the health volunteers can potentially play an integral role in the management of the new health conditions as well. The extent to
which this can happen, however, has not been evaluated. Apart from answering
the research questions listed earlier, this paper also helps ﬁll that gap.
Each health volunteer is responsible for her ward, which is the lowest administrative unit in the country (before the new federal setup was implemented in
2017). In the study site, a ward had 284 households on average in 2011 (the
latest year of the census), ranging from 28 households in the smallest one to
760 in the largest. The share of advantaged households ranged from 3% to
97%, with an average of 23%. The share of the advantaged population is 44%
(authors’ calculations based on the 2011 census data). As discussed later, because
the health volunteers have worked in their ward for several years, the advantaged
or disadvantaged status of a household is known to them even without asking
for the individual’s name. The public can also infer it from the individual’s last
name.
III. The Study Design
There are two levels of randomization in this study. In the ﬁrst level, we randomly assigned 72 health volunteers into four arms stratiﬁed by their ethnic
category (advantaged vs. disadvantaged), experience, and education. We stratiﬁed in order to ensure that each arm had a reasonable number of health volunteers from the traditionally advantaged and disadvantaged ethnic groups.
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We collected information on ethnicity, experience, and education from local
health centers before the experiment.
We invited the health volunteers for 1-day training on diabetes at their local
health center. A practicing endocrinologist provided information to the health
volunteers—in Nepali, the dominant local language—on basic risk factors for
diabetes, prevention, symptoms, and implications if not treated on time.
After the training, 2 days before the checkup, the research team visited the
health volunteers at their home and explained to them the incentive structure
in private. We told the health volunteers that they should refer only one individual (above 18 years of age) per household on the basis of their understanding
of the risk factors learned during the training. As the checkup was only for diagnosis and not for treatment, we also told the health volunteers that they
should not refer individuals who they knew were already diagnosed with diabetes. Nonreferred individuals were welcome to come to the checkup, but they
would not be a part of the study.
We told each volunteer that she would receive an amount of money based on
the number of clients who came for the checkup at their local health center on the
prespeciﬁed date and time and according to the schedule in table 1. To summarize, in the Low and High arms, the amount of incentive per referral did not depend
on the ethnicity of the client the health volunteers recruited. In the Low arm, the
health volunteers received 20 Nepalese rupees (Rs) per referral. The exchange rate
between the US dollar and the Nepalese rupee was US$1 5 Rs 100 at the time of
the experiment. Therefore, Rs 20 is approximately US$0.2 (or 20 cents). In the
High arm, they received Rs 50 per referral. In the remaining two arms, the amount
depended on the ethnicity of the client the health volunteers recruited. In the
NudgeDis arm, the amount was higher for recruiting a client from a disadvantaged group (Rs 50) than for recruiting a client from an advantaged group
(Rs 20). In the NudgeAdv arm, the amount was higher for recruiting a client
from an advantaged group (Rs 50) than for recruiting a client from a disadvantaged group (Rs 20). The comparison of the Low and High arms allows us to
examine the effect of higher, nondifferential incentives on motivation in the

TABLE 1
INCENTIVES PROVIDED TO HEALTH VOLUNTEERS

Number of health volunteers
Refer advantaged
Refer disadvantaged

Arm 1 (Low)

Arm 2 (NudgeDis)

Arm 3 (NudgeAdv)

Arm 4 (High)

17
Low
Low

19
Low
High

16
High
Low

17
High
High

Note. The exchange rate at the time of the experiment was approximately US$1 5 100 Rs. Low 5 Rs 20/
referral; High 5 Rs 50/referral.
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presence of ethnic heterogeneity. The comparison of the Low and NudgeDis
arms allows us to examine whether differential ﬁnancial incentives can be
used to improve the likelihood of a disadvantaged client being referred. The
NudgeAdv arm is not policy relevant, and we use it only for comparison.
To put the incentive amount in context, the health volunteers are generally not
paid a salary but receive some incentives (not based on performance) from the
government, including transport stipends for training and meeting allowances.
In this study, the health volunteers were provided a lump sum of Rs 600 (approximately US$6) on the day of the training to cover the cost of transportation
and to offset their opportunity cost of time that day. A semiskilled worker in
the area earns approximately Rs 400 per day, close to the Rs 8,000 per month
minimum wage set by the government. If a health volunteer in the Low arm recruited 50 clients, and if all showed up, she would receive Rs 1,000, which is
2.5 times the daily wage of a semiskilled worker in the area.
We gave each health volunteer one full day to recruit clients. If the checkup
was scheduled for Friday morning, for example, the health volunteer received the
referral cards and the letters on Wednesday afternoon. Given the short duration
between the time we explained the incentives to the health volunteers and the
time of the checkup, it is reasonable to expect that the health volunteers did
not share information about their incentive with other health volunteers. Although it is not possible to conﬁrm this empirically, anecdotally, husbands of
two health volunteers approached the research team during the checkup and
asked why we had not paid any money to the health volunteers for their work,
indicating that at least in those two cases, the health volunteers had not revealed
the incentive even to their husbands. After the experiment was over, we paid all
health volunteers Rs 2,500, which was the incentive amount of the highest earning volunteer.
The second level of randomization is at the client level. We randomized incentives received by the clients for showing up for the sugar level assessment.
As discussed in section I, this additional randomization allows us to evaluate
the effect of incentives on the decision to appear for the sugar level assessment
and whether incentives can help offset the barriers to health care utilization from
the clients’ perspective. Through the health volunteers, we sent each client an
invitation letter that speciﬁed a randomly assigned amount between Rs 20
and Rs 50 (in intervals of Rs 10) that the client would receive if she or he came
to the health center for the checkup. The health volunteers gave clients the letter
along with the referral card. The health volunteers themselves did not know the
amount the client would receive for coming to the checkup, and we told them
not to open the letters themselves. Without opening the envelopes, it was not
possible to know the amount mentioned in the letter. However, given the low
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literacy in the area, we instructed the health volunteers to read the letters to the
clients if the clients asked.
We gave 50 letters along with 50 referral cards to each health volunteer. We
told the health volunteers that they could call the research team if they needed
more cards and letters or if the clients had questions about the study. Although
no health volunteer called for additional cards, several of them used all 50 cards.
Like in the case of the health volunteers, there was a short duration between the
time a client received the letter specifying the amount and the time of the
checkup; hence, the chances of spillovers—speciﬁcally, the chances of one client’s decision to come to the checkup being altered by the knowledge of what
other clients were receiving—are low. However, such spillovers remain a possibility, a limitation we turn to in section VII.
To keep track of all clients to whom the health volunteers provided the referral cards, the referral card had the design of a boarding pass (ﬁg. 1). The
health volunteers gave one part of the card to clients and kept the other part.
In the part that she kept, the volunteer was asked to write the name and contact
information of the individual she spoke to and the code on the envelope that
she gave the individual. The research team collected the cards from the health
centers at the time of the checkup and from the volunteers the same morning.
The coding system in referral cards, the envelopes, and the survey questionnaire allowed us to match each individual client to the health volunteer and

Figure 1. Referral card provided to health volunteers. Health volunteers were asked to provide one side of the referral card to the client they referred and keep the stub. We collected the stubs from the health volunteers on the
day of the checkup in their respective health centers. The identiﬁcation number on top enabled us to match the
health volunteer to the clients. For each client, we were able to identify the health volunteer who referred them
and, on the basis of the envelop number (of the letter provided by the health volunteer along with this referral card),
the amount the client would have received if the client came to the health center for the sugar level assessment.
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to know how many clients each health volunteer referred, their ethnicity,
whether they showed up, and the ﬁnancial incentives the clients received (or
would have received, for those who did not come).
We collected additional information on the health volunteers and the clients who came to the checkup using a survey. We administered the survey
to the health volunteers on the day of their training and to the clients when
they appeared for the checkup.
We held checkups in eight health centers. On a prespeciﬁed date, the research team visited the centers to conduct the checkup and to administer
the survey to the clients who came. The nurses recruited for this experiment
tested the blood sugar levels using a handheld Nova-Stat Glucometer. The
Nova-Stat Glucometer has been found to be reliable and accurate for the determination of blood glucose levels (Rabiee et al. 2010). Nonetheless, the nurses
advised those with high sugar levels to go to a hospital for further diagnosis.
The study was not registered and a preanalysis plan was not submitted. A brief
discussion of the statistical power in the study is in order. Our main intervention
is at the level of the health volunteers, while we evaluate the outcome at the level
of the individual client. We assumed that in the Low arm, health volunteers would
recruit 40% disadvantaged clients (roughly the proportion of disadvantaged
health volunteers) and that an increase to 60% in the NudgeDis arm (roughly
the proportion of underlying disadvantaged population) would be meaningful
as a policy, given that the incentive for a disadvantaged referral increases by
150% between the Low and the NudgeDis arms. With the short duration given
to health volunteers for referral, we expected that they would refer 25 clients on
average in each arm. Assuming an intraclass correlation of 0.14, we had 82%
power to detect a 20 percentage point change in the proportion of disadvantaged
clients between the Low and the NudgeDis arms.1 Although the study was sufﬁciently powered for the main outcome (probability of a disadvantaged referral),
we did not have enough power to evaluate several intermediate outcomes with
larger variances, including the number of disadvantaged referrals. Therefore, in
our results, we report p-values from a randomization inference test, which is
more amenable to analysis involving small samples. Following Cohen and Dupas
(2010), we report coefﬁcients and clustered standard errors and the p-values
from the randomization inference test. For our main results, we also report the
95% CIs throughout the text.

1

The assumptions about intraclass correlation were taken from the pilot of Goldberg et al. (2018), in
which the randomization is at the level of the health centers. The details of that pilot are now available at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/773.
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IV. Empirical Approach
A. The Effect of Incentives on Disadvantaged Referrals
In order to evaluate whether incentives geared toward encouraging the referral
of disadvantaged individuals increase their chances of receiving a referral, we
estimate the coefﬁcients in the following equation:
Y ij 5 b1 1 b2 NudgeDisj 1 b3 NudgeAdvj 1 b4 Highj 1 dX 1 εij : (1)
In equation (1), Yij is a binary indicator that equals 1 if the individual i referred by a health volunteer j is from the disadvantaged group. The arms differ
by the health volunteer. The Low arm is the excluded arm. The vector X includes a set of health volunteer characteristics that may inﬂuence their ability
to recruit clients or their choice of client. These include the health volunteer’s
age, education level, experience, distance to the health center (measured as the
number of minutes it takes the volunteer to reach the health center), ethnicity,
occupation, and household income. They also include the amount of money
they received for their work as a health volunteer in the previous month, the
number of households they usually visit per month, and the proportion of disadvantaged households in their ward based on the 2011 census. We cluster the
standard errors at the health volunteer level—the level of randomization.
To further check the validity of randomization and the stability of coefﬁcients,
we ﬁrst estimate the equation with only the variables used for stratiﬁcation (ethnicity, experience, and education). We then estimate it with additional characteristics of the health volunteer (occupation, number of households normally
visited per month, amount received for work as a health volunteer the previous
month, and distance to the health center). Finally, we add two variables related
to accessibility: the proportion of disadvantaged households in the ward and
whether the ward is extreme (deﬁned as a ward with less than 10% population
of one of the two groups), both based on the data available from the 2011 census.
While we do not present a formal model, the underlying assumption in our
study is that a health volunteer maximizes her objective function, which is the
sum of extrinsic motivation (ﬁnancial incentive) and intrinsic motivation (such
as reciprocity) minus the cost of recruiting. We assume that reciprocity is higher
for an own-type referral (such as a disadvantaged health volunteer referring a disadvantaged client) and that the cost of recruiting is higher for an other-type referral (i.e., when an advantaged health volunteer refers a disadvantaged client,
or vice versa).
It is difﬁcult to predict the signs of the coefﬁcients on equation (1) ex ante.
If the differential incentives geared toward a disadvantaged referral are enough
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to offset the cost of reaching out to them and do not crowd out the intrinsic motivation, we expect b2 > 0. If the cost of reaching out to disadvantaged clients are substantially higher for advantaged health volunteers than for
disadvantaged health volunteers, b2 > 0 only for disadvantaged health volunteer. b3 is not policy relevant. If higher incentives, which are not conditional
on any speciﬁc type of referral, offset the cost of referring a disadvantaged client
and do not crowd out the intrinsic motivation, then b4 > 0.
We estimate the coefﬁcients in equation (1) separately using two different
samples: ﬁrst using all the clients who received a referral card from the health
volunteers and then using only the clients who showed up to the checkup. We
told health volunteers that the amount of incentive they received would depend on the number of clients who showed up. However, the ﬁrst part is a
better measure of the health volunteers’ response to ﬁnancial incentives and
reﬂects the disadvantaged clients’ chances of being reached out. Therefore, it is
logical to conduct analyses using both samples.
The incentives provided to health volunteers to change their behavior have
the potential to distort their behavior in a way that is inefﬁcient. For example,
driven by ﬁnancial motivation, a health volunteer in the NudgeDis arm may recruit disadvantaged clients who are less likely to be diabetic, even though there
may be other less healthy advantaged clients. In order to test whether such behavior occurs, we run a regression of whether an individual who came to the health
center is diabetic (i.e., had a blood sugar level greater than 125 mg/dL) on the four
arms and various characteristics of the health volunteer and the individual.
Likewise, the increased chances of a disadvantaged referral in the NudgeDis
arm may come at the expense of a reduced total number of referrals if the
health volunteers spend additional time convincing the disadvantaged clients
to go for the checkup or if the health volunteers have a target income. This
issue is particularly relevant in our setting because the health volunteers had
a limited amount of time to refer clients. Therefore, we estimate the relationship between total number of referrals (both in absolute terms and as a share of
the 2011 population in the ward) and the incentive.
Last, to assess whether the increased disadvantaged referrals are due to advantaged health volunteers referring more of the disadvantaged clients or due
to disadvantaged health volunteers referring more of their own type, we interact the incentive arm of the health volunteer with her ethnicity and estimate
coefﬁcients in a regression similar to equation (1). Our expectation is that the
increased disadvantaged referrals may be more strongly driven by the disadvantaged health volunteers than by the advantaged workers since disadvantaged health workers have (1) lower cost of reaching out to their own type
and (2) higher expected reciprocity from the disadvantaged referral.
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B. Demand (Client’s) Response
On the clients’ side, the key outcome of interest is whether a disadvantaged client
who received a referral card from a health volunteer showed up for the checkup.
In order to evaluate the general effect of the incentives and whether a higher incentive encourages a disadvantaged client to come to the checkup, we estimate
the coefﬁcients in the following equation:
Y ij 5 a 1 b1,demand Disadvantagedi 1 b2,demand Amount of incentivei
1 b3,demand ðAmount of incentivei  Disadvantagedi Þ 1 dX 1 εj :

(2)

In equation (2), Yij is a binary variable that equals 1 if an individual i referred
by health volunteer j showed up for the checkup and 0 otherwise. Again, X is a
vector of health volunteer characteristics; X also includes a categorical variable
for the arm that the health volunteer belongs to because health volunteers in different arms may put different effort toward convincing the disadvantaged client
to come to the checkup, which in turn may affect the client’s decision. Finally,
X includes health center ﬁxed effects, so the effect is identiﬁed from the within–
health center variation in ﬁnancial incentives to the clients.
Given historical patterns in health care utilization in Nepal, the disadvantaged
clients can be expected to be less likely to show up than the advantaged ones.
Therefore, in equation (2), we expect b1,demand < 0. Because the clients receiving
a higher incentive should be more likely to show up, we expect b2,demand > 0. We
hypothesize that with higher incentives, the disadvantaged clients will be more
likely to show up than with lower incentives; therefore, we expect b3,demand > 0.
C. Interaction between Health Volunteers’ and Clients’ Incentives
In the demand analysis above, we have controlled for the incentive arm of the
health volunteer. However, to test formally whether there exists any potential
interaction between the two types of treatments—incentives offered to the
health volunteers and incentives to the clients—we run regressions of the form
in equation (2) but include an interaction between the two layers of incentives. The equation we estimate the coefﬁcients is thus
Yij 5 a 1 b1,demand Disadvantagedi 1 b2,demand Client incentivei
1 b3,demand ðClient incentivei  Disadvantagedi Þ
1 b4,demand HV incentivej
1 b5,demand ðClient incentivei  HV incentivej Þ 1 dX 1 εj :

(3) (3)
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Here, our main outcome Yij is a binary variable that equals 1 if an individual i referred by health volunteer j showed up for the checkup. To evaluate the
effect only on the disadvantaged clients, we estimate the coefﬁcients in the following equation on the subsample of disadvantaged clients:
Y ij 5 a 1 b1,demand Client incentivei 1 b2,demand HV incentivej
1 b3,demand ðClient incentivei  HV incentivej Þ 1 dX 1 εj :

(4)

V. Descriptive Statistics and the Validity of Randomization
Of the 72 health volunteers who had been randomized into four groups, 69
showed up for the training and were recruited for the experiment. The three
health volunteers who did not show up were one each from the Low, NudgeAdv,
and High arms. Of the 69 health volunteers, there were 17 each in the Low and
High arms, 19 in the NudgeDis arm, and 16 in the NudgeAdv arm. Forty-three
of them (62%) were from the advantaged ethnic category, while the remaining
26 (38%) were from the disadvantaged category (table 2). This mix is different
TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR ANALYTIC SAMPLE

Mean

SD

A. Health Volunteers (N 5 69)
Age (years)
Experience (years)
Education higher than grade 10 (1 5 yes)
Had informal schooling (1 5 yes)
Ethnicity (1 5 advantaged)
Number of households visited per month
Received money for work as health volunteer in previous month
Distance to health center (minutes)
Primary occupation is agriculture (1 5 yes)
Has one of ﬁve neighbors from a different ethnicity

46.09
18.96
.28
.10
.62
50.26
.78
29.74
.83
.20

9.28
7.54
.45
.30
.49
42.65
.42
19.89
.38
.41

B. Clients (N 5 2,333)
Gender (1 5 female)
Age (years)
Ethnicity (1 5 advantaged)
Same ethnic category as that of health volunteer
Marital status (1 5 married)
Years of schooling
Distance to health center (minutes)
Primary occupation is agriculture (1 5 yes)
Knew about diabetes before health volunteer’s visit
Knew about checkup from health volunteer
Health volunteer informed client by visiting client’s house

.60
52.07
.56
.66
.89
4.11
26.93
.82
.61
.99
.98

.49
12.33
.50
.47
.31
4.64
24.32
.38
.49
.09
.12

Note. Clients include individuals who received a referral card from a health volunteer, showed up for the
checkup, and answered the questionnaire administered by the research team. As mentioned in the text, of
the 2,825 individuals who received a referral card, 2,403 showed up. Of those, 2,365 were interviewed and
2,333 provided complete information on the various indicators above.
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from the one in the underlying population in the study site in which the share
of the advantaged population is 44% (authors’ calculations based on the 2011
census data). For comparison, in the country as a whole, advantaged health volunteers constitute 52% of their total number relative to a population share of
35% (authors’ calculations based on New Era [2007, 10]). In the analytical
sample, on average, a health volunteer is 46 years old and has 19 years of experience. All are women. Less than one-third of health volunteers have completed the school-leaving certiﬁcate (equivalent to the sophomore year of high
school in the United States), and 10% have only informal education. On average, a health volunteer in the sample visited 50 households in the month preceding the survey and lives half an hour away from the nearest local health center. Seventy-eight percent of health volunteers received honorarium for their
work in the month before the survey, and 82% of health volunteers reported
agriculture as their main occupation.
The health volunteers distributed the referral cards to 2,825 clients (average 5 40.9 cards per health volunteer). This is our main analytic sample. Of
these, 2,403 (85.1%) showed up for the checkup and 2,365 (98.4% of all those
who showed up) were interviewed. The remaining 38 include clients who showed
up after the interviewers had left. For clients who received the cards from the health
volunteers but did not show up, we have data on their ethnicity and the amount
of incentive they would have received for showing up. Of the 2,365 clients who
were interviewed, information on some of the covariates is missing for a total of
32 clients, leaving a second analytical sample of 2,333 (97% of all clients who
showed up and 98.6% of all clients who were interviewed).
Among those who showed up and provided complete information, 60% of
clients are women, the average age is 52 years, and 56% are from an advantaged
ethnic category (table 2). Sixty-six percent are from the same ethnic category as
that of the health volunteer. Eighty-nine percent are married, and the average
education level is grade 4. On average, clients live 27 minutes away from the
nearest health center, 82% are engaged in agriculture, and 61% had heard
about diabetes before the study. Almost all of them heard about the sugar level
checkups from their health volunteer. In 98% of cases, the health volunteer visited the individual at home to talk about diabetes and to give the referral card
and the letter.
Randomization divided the health volunteers into four similar arms (table 3).
For many health volunteers, their actual experience, age, and level of education—
self-reported during the interviews—were different from the information collected from the health centers before randomization (not shown). On the basis
of the self-reported information, there is a decrease in age and experience going
from the Low arm to the High arm. The differences in experience levels are also
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TABLE 3
BALANCE IN KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF HEALTH VOLUNTEERS BETWEEN ARMS

Age (years)
Experience (years)
Education higher than grade 10 (1 5 yes)
Had informal schooling (1 5 yes)
Ethnicity (1 5 advantaged)
Income category
Number of households visited per month
Received money in previous month
Distance to health center (minutes)
Primary occupation is agriculture

Low

NudgeDis

NudgeAdv

High

p (All Arms)

49.35
(1.74)
21.29
(1.72)
.24
(.11)
.12
(.08)
.65
(.12)
2.29
(.19)
38.29
(9.69)
.88
(.08)
27.94
(3.79)
.76
(.11)

47.95
(1.81)
20.63
(1.50)
.11
(.07)
.11
(.07)
.58
(.12)
2.05
(.19)
60.53
(10.14)
.84
(.09)
35.79
(5.32)
.84
(.09)

45.31
(2.72)
18.81
(1.84)
.38
(.13)
.13
(.09)
.63
(.13)
2.06
(.17)
54.38
(9.87)
.69
(.12)
30.75
(5.06)
.81
(.10)

41.47
(2.36)
14.88
(1.97)
.41
(.12)
.06
(.06)
.65
(.12)
1.88
(.26)
46.88
(11.30)
.71
(.11)
23.82
(4.63)
.88
(.08)

.06
.05
.16
.62
.97
.57
.45
.43
.33
.84

Note. The p-values are from the joint orthogonality test of the arms. All variables reported here were selfreported by the health volunteers. Income was categorized into four groups: 1 5 less than Rs 50,000 per
year; 2 5 Rs 50,000–100,000 per year; 3 5 Rs 100,000–200,000 per year; 4 5 Rs 200,000–500,000 per
year; 5 5 more than Rs 500,000 per year. The mean income category reported in this table is based on
those categories.

not negligible, particularly for the high group. Further, even with the stratiﬁcation, the differences in education levels are substantively large, although the null
of equality cannot be rejected at standard levels. The p-values are from a joint
orthogonality test of all arms. The p-values from pairwise comparison of all arms
are in table A1 (tables A1–A5 are available online). The health volunteers in the
Low and NudgeDis arms—the key arms—are not statistically different from each
other in any of the observable characteristics (col. 1). However, the health volunteers in the High arm differ signiﬁcantly from those in the Low arm in terms
of age and experience (col. 3) and from those in the NudgeDis arm in terms
of age, experience, and distance to the health center (col. 5). We control for these
characteristics in all regressions.
As mentioned in section III, we gave 50 letters along with 50 referral cards to
each health volunteer and informed them that they could call the research team if
they needed more cards and letters or if the clients had questions. None of them
called. The extent to which the health volunteers used all referral cards can affect
the validity of our ﬁndings if the proportion of health volunteers who use all
50 cards differs by arm. Thirty-ﬁve (50.7%) volunteers used all 50 referral cards.
Ten of them were from the Low arm, eight from the NudgeDis arm, seven from
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the NudgeAdv arm, and 10 from the High arm. We created a binary variable for
whether the health volunteers used all 50 cards and regressed that variable on the
nudge arm as well as the covariates used in the main analysis, and we found that
the proportions of health volunteers who distributed all 50 cards did not vary
statistically by arm (not shown),
On the demand side, the health volunteers in all arms had similar probabilities of receiving letters offering Rs 20, Rs 30, Rs 40, and Rs 50, which conﬁrms
the validity of randomization of incentives to the clients (ﬁg. A1, available
online). There is no evidence that the health volunteers opened the envelopes
beforehand to give letters mentioning a higher amount to their own-type clients—the proportion of envelopes going to own-type clients were 64.7% for
Rs 20, 66% for Rs 30, 63.2% for Rs 40, and 64.4% for Rs 50. The characteristics of clients across four different incentive arms are also balanced, except for
the proportion of clients who reported that they had heard about diabetes even
before the health volunteers visited them (table A2).
VI. Main Empirical Results
A. The Effect of Incentives on Disadvantaged Referral
On the basis of the number of referral cards distributed by the health volunteers,
approximately 43% of the clients receiving them were disadvantaged (table 4).
Recall that the share of disadvantaged individuals in the population in the study
site is approximately 56%. On the basis of the fully speciﬁed model (panel A,
col. 3), incentives geared toward a disadvantaged referral increased the chances
of such a referral by 11.6 percentage points (95% CI, 1.1–22.1). This effect represents an increase in the number of disadvantaged referrals of nearly 27%
(5 100  0.12/0.43). From the Low arm to the NudgeDis arm, the amount
of incentive changed by 150% (i.e., went up from Rs 20 to Rs 50), which means
that the incentive elasticity of referral is approximately 0.2 (5 27/150). The coefﬁcient on NudgeDis is stable across the three speciﬁcations, suggesting that the
effects are likely not driven by factors other than the differential incentives, including those related to accessibility.
The results are similar, if not larger, when we use the sample of clients who
showed up to the checkup at the health center. The coefﬁcient of 0.12 on
NudgeDis (panel B, col. 3; 95% CI, 0.015–0.224) implies that the number
of disadvantaged referrals increased by 29% (5 100  0.12/0.41) in response
to the incentives geared toward a disadvantaged referral. The corresponding
incentive elasticity of referral is again close to 0.2.
In columns 1–3 of table 4, the coefﬁcients on the NudgeAdv and High arms
are close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant, and the CIs are wide (not
shown). The p-values from the randomization inference test for the coefﬁcient

TABLE 4
REGRESSION RESULTS OF DISADVANTAGED CLIENT REFERRAL

Probability of Disadvantaged
Client Referral
(1)

(2)

(3)

Number of
Disadvantaged
Referrals
(4)

A. Based on Initial Referrals (n 5 2,825; N 5 69;
Baseline Proportion of Disadvantage Clients 5 .43;
Baseline Number of Disadvantage Clients 5 17.35)
NudgeDis
RI p
NudgeAdv
RI p
High
RI p
R2

.138*
(.082)
.134
2.056
(.080)
.538
2.002
(.075)
.977
.115

.117
(.076)
.221
2.077
(.075)
.413
2.008
(.081)
.938
.142

.116**
(.052)
.078
2.006
(.061)
.932
.037
(.059)
.594
.211

3.629
(3.525)
.343
22.220
(3.814)
.578
24.064
(3.791)
.287
.534

B. Based on Clients Who Showed Up (n 5 2,403; N 5 69;
Baseline Proportion of Disadvantage Clients 5 .41;
Baseline Number of Disadvantage Clients 5 14.53)
NudgeDis
RI p
NudgeAdv
RI p
High
RI p
R2

.134
(.086)
.180
2.044
(.086)
.636
.006
(.082)
.952
.119

.122
(.079)
.232
2.059
(.078)
.564
2.001
(.085)
.990
.153

.120**
(.052)
.091
.018
(.065)
.840
.050
(.062)
.490
.233

4.094
(3.227)
.232
22.430
(3.429)
.488
24.414
(3.216)
.167
.569

C. Additional Covariates (for Panels A and B)
Stratiﬁcation variables
Other health volunteer characteristics
Accessibility-related variables

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Note. The results in this table are from estimating equation (1) separately for the sample of all clients
who received a referral card from their health volunteer (panel A) and those who came to the health center
for the checkup (panel B). Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the health volunteer
level. In cols. 1–3, the dependent variable is whether a client referred by a health volunteer is from a disadvantaged group. In col. 4, the dependent variable is the number of disadvantaged referrals. Stratiﬁcation variables include ethnicity, experience, and education. Other health volunteer characteristics include
age, annual household income, number of households the health volunteer visited in the past month, the
amount of money she received for working as a health volunteer, distance to the nearest health center, and
primary occupation. The accessibility-related variables include the share of disadvantaged households in
the ward and whether the ward had less than 10% population of any of the two groups. The p-values are
from randomization inference (RI). When estimating the randomization p-values, we reassign treatment
status at the health volunteer level. The Stata codes used to generate these p-values are available from the
authors on request. N 5 number of health volunteers; n 5 number of clients.
* p < :10.
** p < :05.
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on NudgeDis in column 3 is small enough for us to reject no effect. Finally, the
results are also robust to using bootstrapped standard errors (table A3).
Higher incentives as well as the incentives geared toward an advantaged referral (which, as mentioned earlier, are policy irrelevant) had no effect on the
chances of a disadvantaged referral—using both samples. The lack of an effect
of higher incentives on disadvantaged referral suggests that while such incentives
may improve health services utilization in general, they are not particularly effective in improving health service utilization by the disadvantaged groups.
In column 4 of table 4, we report results on the absolute number of disadvantaged referrals. On average, the NudgeDis incentives induce the health volunteers to recruit 3.6 (95% CI, 23.4 to 10.7) additional disadvantaged clients
on the basis of the initial number of referrals (panel A, col. 4) and 4.1 (95% CI,
22.3 to 10.5) additional disadvantaged clients on the basis of the clients who
came to the health center for the checkup (panel B, col. 4). Given the high variance in the number of disadvantaged referrals within each arm, our study is not
sufﬁciently powered to detect this effect.
The higher chances of a disadvantaged referral in the NudgeDis arm do not
seem to come at the cost of reduced total number of referrals. In fact, there is no
evidence that the incentives offered to health volunteers differentially affect the
total number of referrals (table 5) or total referrals as a share of the total population in the health volunteer’s ward (table A4). Regarding whether the health
volunteers engage in gaming—that is, referring healthier disadvantaged clients to
beneﬁt from higher incentives even when there are sicker advantaged clients—
we ﬁnd no evidence supporting such gaming. Approximately 4.4% of the clients who were provided a referral card and came to the checkup were diabetic
(table 6). Clients in the NudgeDis, NudgeAdv, and High arms were all more
likely to be diabetic than those in the Low arm. These ﬁndings show that higher
incentives, irrespective of who they are induced to recruit, encourage the health
volunteers to identify and target patients who are more in need of the service.
However, we do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant difference in the effect between the three arms.
The higher chances of a disadvantaged referral in response to the NudgeDis
incentives seem to come from disadvantaged health volunteers referring more
of their own type than from the advantaged health volunteer referring more
disadvantaged clients. Figure 2 shows the probability of a disadvantaged referral in each incentive arm by the ethnicity of the health volunteer—again separately based on initial referrals (ﬁg. 2a) and based on the sample of clients who
came to the health center (ﬁg. 2b). The full set of regression results behind
these ﬁgures is in table A5. The ﬁgures show that at baseline, there is no difference between advantaged and disadvantaged health volunteers in terms of
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TABLE 5
REGRESSION RESULTS OF TOTAL NUMBER OF REFERRALS ON INCENTIVE ARMS

(1)

(2)

(3)

A. Based on Initial Referrals (n 5 2,825; N 5 69;
Baseline Total Number of Referrals 5 40.11)
NudgeDis
RI p
NudgeAdv
RI p
High
RI p
R2

1.225
(4.570)
.805
1.419
(4.510)
.790
2.695
(5.526)
.891
.043

1.325
(3.647)
.763
1.291
(4.278)
.806
23.323
(4.389)
.480
.236

1.356
(3.703)
.750
2.261
(4.466)
.675
24.439
(4.626)
.344
.280

B. Based on Clients Who Showed Up (n 5 2,403;
N 5 69; Baseline Total Number of Referrals 5 35.59)
NudgeDis
RI p
NudgeAdv
RI p
High
RI p
R2

.358
(4.591)
.946
22.509
(4.517)
.611
21.600
(4.925)
.744
.067

1.716
(3.776)
.679
22.181
(3.995)
.670
24.443
(3.938)
.313
.289

2.290
(3.697)
.569
2.515
(4.101)
.914
25.886
(4.071)
.188
.378

C. Additional Covariates (for Panels A and B)
Stratiﬁcation variables
Other health volunteer characteristics
Accessibility-related variables

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Note. The results in this table are from estimating regressions of the total number of referrals on the incentive arms separately for the sample of all clients who received a referral card from their health volunteer
(panel A) and the sample of those who came to the health center for the checkup (panel B). Standard errors
are in parentheses. Stratiﬁcation variables include ethnicity, experience, and education. Other health volunteer characteristics include age, annual household income, number of households the health volunteer
visited in the past month, the amount of money she received for working as a health volunteer, distance
to the nearest health center, and primary occupation. The accessibility-related variables include the share
of disadvantaged households in the ward and whether the ward had less than 10% population of any of
the two groups. The p-values are from randomization inference (RI). N 5 number of health volunteers; n 5
number of clients.

whether they refer a disadvantaged client. For advantaged health volunteers,
the chances of a disadvantaged referral do not change across the incentive arms.
For the disadvantaged health volunteers, the chances of a disadvantaged referral
increase signiﬁcantly from baseline to the NudgeDis arm. Put together, table 4
and ﬁgure 2 suggest that if the policy goal is to increase health care utilization
by disadvantaged groups in this setting, recruiting more individuals from disadvantaged health volunteers will be insufﬁcient, as will providing differential
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TABLE 6
REGRESSION RESULTS OF CLIENTS’ DIABETIC STATUS ON HEALTH VOLUNTEERS’ INCENTIVES

NudgeDis
NudgeAdv
High
R2
Number of clients
Additional covariates:
Stratiﬁcation variables
Health volunteer characteristics

(1)

(2)

(3)

.025**
(.012)
.030*
(.015)
.010
(.010)
.002
2,354

.024**
(.011)
.034**
(.015)
.021**
(.010)
.005
2,354

.032***
(.009)
.034***
(.011)
.026***
(.009)
.012
2,354

No
No

Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Note. The results in this table are from estimating equation (1) on the sample of clients who received a
referral card from their health volunteer and came to the health center for the checkup. The proportion of
individuals who are diabetic in the Low arm is 0.04. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at
the health volunteer level. Health volunteer characteristics include ethnicity, experience, education, age,
annual household income, number of households the health volunteer visited in the past month, the amount
of money she received for working as a health volunteer, distance to the nearest health center, and primary
occupation.
* p < :10.
** p < :05.
*** p < :01.

incentives to the advantaged health volunteers. Instead, an effective approach
will be to recruit more disadvantaged health volunteers and provide them incentives geared toward a disadvantaged referral.
Given the similar propensity to refer disadvantaged clients at baseline by
advantaged and disadvantaged clients, the ethnic barrier prevalent in this setting does not appear to be one of taste-based discrimination (from advantaged
to disadvantaged). In fact, as the demand-side analysis suggests (discussed next),

Figure 2. Probability of a disadvantaged referral by health volunteer’s incentive arm for disadvantaged and advantaged health volunteers. The ﬁgure is based on the sample of all clients who were referred by the health volunteers (a)
and all clients who were referred by the health volunteers and came to the health center for the sugar level assessment (b).
The probabilities were obtained from estimating equation (1) by interacting health volunteers’ ethnicity with the incentive arm in the sample of clients who came to the health center. The full set of numbers corresponding to a and b are in
columns 1 and 2, respectively, of table A5.

784

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE

the low number of disadvantaged referrals seem to originate in health volunteers’
knowledge about the disadvantaged groups’ low likelihood of showing up.
B. Effect of Incentives on Demand (Decision to Access Services)
On the demand side, overall, the incentives to the clients—in the range tested,
that is, between Rs 20 and Rs 50—were inconsequential in affecting the clients’
decision to come to the checkup after the health volunteers referred them (table 7,
col. 1). Consistent with our expectation, the disadvantaged clients were less likely
to come to the checkup compared with the advantaged clients even after receiving a referral card (col. 2). Conditional on being referred, the disadvantaged clients are approximately 5 percentage points less likely to show up to the health
center than advantaged clients. It is possible that the health volunteers are aware
of the disadvantaged clients’ lower inclination to access health care and therefore are less likely to refer them at baseline. To clarify further why disadvantaged
TABLE 7
REGRESSION RESULTS OF CLIENTS’ DECISION TO SHOW UP FOR CHECKUP

(1)
Incentive amount (Rs)

2.0008
(.0007)

(2)

.0050
(.0336)
2.1170***
(.0419)
2.0718**
(.0311)

.0087
(.0331)
2.1226***
(.0411)
2.0718**
(.0301)

2.0417
(.0444)
2.0003
(.0013)
.0098
(.0332)
2.1217***
(.0410)
2.0710**
(.0300)

.053
2,760

.056
2,760

.057
2,760

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Incentive amount  disadvantaged client
NudgeDis
NudgeAdv
High
NudgeDis  incentive amount
NudgeAdv  incentive amount
High  incentive amount
R2
N
Additional covariates:
Health volunteers characteristics
Health center ﬁxed effects

(4)
2.0016
(.0012)
2.0359
(.0450)
2.0004
(.0013)
2.0558
(.0769)
2.1429*
(.0779)
2.1255**
(.0596)
.0019
(.0018)
.0006
(.0020)
.0016
(.0016)
.058
2,760

Disadvantaged client

2.0006
(.0008)
2.0511***
(.0181)

(3)

Note. Each column represents a separate regression. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the health volunteer level. The health volunteer characteristics include ethnicity, experience, education, age, annual household income, number of households the health volunteer visited in the past
month, the amount of money she received for working as a health volunteer, distance to the nearest health
center, and primary occupation.
* p < :10.
** p < :05.
*** p < :01.
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individuals are less likely to be targeted at baseline, one could argue that it is because disadvantaged clients suffer less from diabetes. To our knowledge, populationlevel prevalence rates broken down by ethnicity are not available for our geographic area. The prevalence rates of diabetes are similar in the study setting on
the basis of the clients who came to the checkup (5.7% for advantaged clients
and 5.8% for disadvantaged clients). Put everything together, it is likely that
disadvantaged clients are less receptive to the information provided by the health
worker on diabetes and are hence less likely to show up to the clinic conditional
on being referred.
A few additional observations from columns 1–3 of table 7 are noteworthy.
Even controlling for health volunteer’s arms and other characteristics, the standard errors on the key variable—interaction of being disadvantaged and incentive amount—are large relative to the coefﬁcient (col. 3). Overall, higher
incentives provided directly to the clients do not seem to increase the chances
of appearing for the checkup. In section VII, we provide a few setting-speciﬁc
conjectures for why this might be happening.
C. Interaction between Health Volunteers’ and Clients’ Incentives
We have so far shown that incentives geared toward a disadvantaged referral
yield expected results without distorting health volunteers behavior (i.e., encouraging them to refer fewer individuals overall or to refer less sick patients). We
have also shown that the effects are driven by the disadvantaged health volunteers who behave similar to advantaged health volunteers at baseline but increase own-type referrals in the NudgeDis arm. The low chance of a disadvantaged referral at baseline seems to be due to the fact that disadvantaged clients
are generally less likely to come to the checkup—the premise of our study.
It is worth checking whether the two layers of the incentives interacted in
an unintended way and biased the estimates of the effect of incentives to the
clients on their decision to show up. In column 4 of table 7, we conﬁrm that
there are no interaction effects between the two types of treatments (incentives
for health volunteers and incentives for clients).
In ﬁgure 3, we show the probability of coming to the checkup conditional
on being referred, generated from equation (3). It shows that a client’s chances
of coming to the checkup are signiﬁcantly higher when referred by a health volunteer in the NudgeDis arm than when referred by a health volunteer in the
NudgeAdv or High arm. This indicates that substantially higher efforts are exerted by health volunteers in the NudgeDis arm when talking to the targeted
clients, which is successfully translated into the actual output. We see a similarly high chance of coming to checkup for the clients referred by a health volunteer in the Low arm.

786

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Figure 3. Client’s probability of coming to checkup conditional on being referred by health volunteer, by health volunteer’s incentive arm. The probabilities were generated by estimating equation (3) on the sample of clients referred
by the health volunteers. The outcome is whether a client referred by a health volunteer came to the checkup.

That we observe a higher likelihood of workers’ efforts being translated into
the output under the Low arm and NudgeDis arm than under the High arm may
have been caused by extrinsic motivations being crowded out by the intrinsic
motivations. However, we cannot test it empirically.
VII. Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, we showed that the uptake of health care services by traditionally
disadvantaged groups can be raised by providing differential incentives—ones
geared toward a disadvantaged referral—to health outreach workers. We showed
that without incentives (speciﬁcally, small incentives), health workers would refer disproportionately fewer disadvantaged individuals. In our case, the workers
referred 43% disadvantaged individuals relative to a population share of 56%.
Incentives geared toward disadvantaged referrals raised the proportion by 11.6 percentage points (95% CI, 1.1 to 22.1), bringing them close to the proportion of
the disadvantaged population. Such differential incentives do not have adverse
effects on efﬁciency—in fact, the likelihood of having diabetes was similar for
clients recruited in all arms except the low incentive arm. From a policy perspective, these are encouraging ﬁndings. The higher share of the disadvantaged
referrals does not seem to come at the cost of reduced total referrals; put differently, incentive geared toward disadvantaged referrals does not suffer from
trade-off between better targeting and lower coverage. Upon closer examination,
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we showed that the increased disadvantaged referrals primarily come through
higher own-type referrals by disadvantaged health volunteers.
Although the study was not set up to parse out the discrimination from other
barriers, the low number of disadvantaged referrals at baseline by both advantaged and disadvantaged health volunteers suggests that taste-based discrimination is not a major barrier among ethnic groups in this setting. While this
is good news, it also threatens the external validity of our ﬁndings. The study
site is a semiurban area with better availability of schools, health facilities, drinking water, and electricity than in the rest of Nepal, and a large share of the residents are permanent migrants from other parts of the country. Therefore, it is
likely that the level of barriers between ethnic groups is higher elsewhere in the
country.
The reader should understand our ﬁndings, especially the magnitudes of
the effects, in light of a number of other limitations. We gave the volunteers only
one full day to recruit clients. While the short duration was appropriate given
our interest in the mix of clients, it is difﬁcult to imagine real-world outreach
efforts where agents have so limited time to deliver outcomes. From the onset,
the health volunteers were aware of the temporary nature of the ﬁnancial incentives. It is possible that they would behave differently if similar incentives
were to be provided as a policy, thus making these incentives a regular income.
We conducted the study at a time when the health volunteers did not have any
other major activity (such as visiting households to encourage them to take the
kids for vitamin A supplementation). Our incentives may have also crowded
out other activities if we had conducted the study at a busier time.
Likewise, as the checkup took place on a speciﬁc day (by design, as we did
not want to disrupt regular business of the health centers), it is possible that
the clients who came were nonrepresentative of the underlying population. For
example, poorer individuals who valued the incentives may have been more likely
to show up. We expect this not to be a signiﬁcant issue in this study, as we conducted the study during a postcultivation season and the checkup took place in
the mornings between 7 and 10 a.m. (the regular businesses open at 10 a.m.).
Nonetheless, the short duration for showing up is a possible threat to the external validity of our results.
The short duration provided to the health volunteers for recruiting clients
and to the clients for the checkup likely reduced spillovers, which we conﬁrmed
anecdotally. An immediate area for investigation is the nature of the barrier
that health workers and disadvantaged clients face when interacting with each
other—in other words, the barriers that the differential incentives seem to offset in our study. Our analysis suggests that the primary barrier in this setting is
not taste-based discrimination and that the health volunteers are likely optimizing
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their effort by focusing on the clients who are more likely to come to the
checkup—in this case, the advantaged clients. A larger sample size would be
required to conﬁrm this and to investigate the reasons why disadvantaged clients are less likely to utilize health care even after health volunteers have reached
them.
The ﬁnding that incentives to the clients—which were exogenous—had
no effect on the decision to come to the checkup also warrants further research.
It is possible that the amount of incentive offered to the clients signaled the
service’s quality, with higher incentives signaling lower quality. It is also possible that the lowest incentive amount provided to the client—Rs 20—was already high enough in terms of offsetting the costs they faced when going for the
checkup, and therefore the additional amount had no effect on their decision.
This second argument is consistent with the high uptake in this study—approximately 85% of the clients approached by the health volunteers came to the
sugar level assessment—and a number of other studies that have similarly found
a weak association between demand and the size of the incentive beyond the
fact that it is a positive incentive (Thornton 2008; Filmer and Schady 2009;
Banerjee et al. 2010). Nonetheless, more research will be needed to understand
why demand is not responsive to incentives in this setting. We collected a limited amount of information (namely, information on the incentive amount and
ethnicity) from the clients who were referred by the health volunteers but did
not come to the checkup. This limited our ability to comment on whether the
effect of incentives to clients on the decision to come to the checkup varies by
factors such as education level, gender, previous experience with the health sector, and distance from the health center.
In the meantime, the high uptake in this study suggests that the health volunteers can continue to play an important role in encouraging preventive health
behavior in Nepal, even for newer health conditions. The policy challenge now is
to build an incentive structure so that the signiﬁcant disparities prevalent in the
uptake of common, communicable diseases and their outcomes do not extend
to the newer, noncommunicable conditions, such as diabetes.
Beyond Nepal, the methodological approach we adopted—differential incentives based on the ethnicity of the individual that a client interacts with—
may be applied to several settings as a way to improve health care utilization by
disadvantaged and minority groups. In fact, the disproportionate representation of advantaged groups in the relevant workforce and the resulting uneven
uptake by and gains for individuals from different groups is a common problem in many government programs. Examples of potential applications of our
method beyond health include efforts to raise diversity in universities and to
raise the uptake of government services by disadvantaged groups.

Acharya and Kim

789

References
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. 2014. “National Healthcare Disparities
Report 2013.” Rockville, MD: US Department of Health and Human Services.
http://www.ahrq.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/publications/ﬁles/2013nhdr.pdf.
Andersen, K., A. Singh, M. K. Shrestha, M. Shah, E. Pearson, and L. Hessini. 2013.
“Early Pregnancy Detection by Female Community Health Volunteers in Nepal
Facilitated Referral for Appropriate Reproductive Health Services.” Global Health:
Science and Practice 1:372–81.
Ashraf, N., O. Bandiera, and K. Jack. 2014. “No Margin, No Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for Pro-Social Tasks.” Journal of Public Economics 120:1–17.
Banerjee, Abhijit Vinayak, Esther Duﬂo, Rachel Glennerster, and Dhruva Kothari.
2010. “Improving Immunisation Coverage in Rural India: Clustered Randomised
Controlled Evaluation of Immunisation Campaigns with and without Incentives.”
BMJ 340:c2220.
Barnes-Mauthe, M., S. Arita, S. D. Allen, S. A. Gray, and P. S. Leung. 2013. “The
Inﬂuence of Ethnic Diversity on Social Network Structure in a Common-Pool Resource System: Implications for Collaborative Management.” Ecology and Society
18, no. 1:23.
Berg, E., M. Ghatak, R. Manjula, D. Rajasekhar, and S. Roy. 2017. “Motivating
Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance?” Economic Journal
129, no. 617:110–42.
Braveman, P., and E. Tarimo. 2002. “Social Inequalities in Health within Countries:
Not Only an Issue for Afﬂuent Nations.” Social Science and Medicine 54:1621–35.
Center for Global Development. 2011. “Reducing Child Mortality with Vitamin A
in Nepal.” Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. http://www.cgdev.org
/doc/millions/MS_case_4.pdf.
Cohen, J., and P. Dupas. 2010. “Free Distribution or Cost-Sharing? Evidence from a
Randomized Malaria Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125, no. 1:1– 45.
Dal Bo, E., F. Finan, and M. A. Rossi. 2013. “Strengthening State Capabilities: The
Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 3:1169–218.
Deserranno, E. 2019. “Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from
the Recruitment of Village Promoters in Uganda.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 11, no. 1:277–317.
Filmer, D., and N. Schady. 2009. “Are There Diminishing Returns to Transfer Size in
Conditional Cash Transfers?” Policy Research Working Paper Series 4999, World
Bank, Washington, DC.
Finan, F., B. A. Olken, and R. Pande. 2017. “The Personnel Economics of the Developing State.” Handbook of Economic Field Experiments 2:467–514.
Goldberg, J., M. Macis, and B. Chintagunta. 2018. “Incentivized Peer Referrals for Tuberculosis Screening: Evidence from India.” Working Paper no. w25279, NBER,
Cambridge, MA. http://www.nber.org/papers/w25279.
Kremer, M., and R. Glennerster. 2011. “Improving Health in Developing Countries:
Evidence from Randomized Evaluations.” Handbook of Health Economics 2:201–
315.

790

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Mishra, S., M. P. Joshi, and V. Khanal. 2014. “Family Planning Knowledge and Practice among People Living with HIV in Nepal.” PLoS ONE 9, no. 2:e88663.
New Era. 2007. “An Analytical Report on National Survey of Female Community
Health Volunteers of Nepal.” Kathmandu: United States Agency for International
Development. https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR181/FCHV_Nepal2007.pdf.
Pandey, J. P., M. R. Dhakal, S. Karki, P. Poudel, and M. S. Pradhan. 2013. “Maternal
and Child Health in Nepal: The Effects of Caste, Ethnicity, and Regional Identity.”
http://www.dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FA73/FA73.pdf.
Rabiee, A., J. T. Magruder, C. Grant, R. Salas-Carrillo, A. Gillette, J. DuBois,
R. P. Shannon, D. K. Andersen, and D. Elahi. 2010. “Accuracy and Reliability
of the Nova StatStrip Glucose Meter for Real-Time Blood Glucose Determinations during Glucose Clamp Studies.” Journal of Diabetes Science and Technolog y
4:1195–201.
Snyder, C. R., B. Stover, S. M. Skillman, and B. K. Frogner. 2015. “Facilitating Racial
and Ethnic Diversity in the Health Workforce.” Seattle, WA: Center for Health
Workforce Studies, University of Washington. https://depts.washington.edu/fammed
/chws/studies/facilitating-racial-and-ethnic-diversity-in-the-health-workforce/.
Thornton, R. 2008. “The Demand for and Impact of Learning HIV Status: Evidence
from a Field Experiment.” American Economic Review 98:1829–63.
World Health Organization. 2016. “Diabetes Country Proﬁles 2016.” http://www.who
.int/diabetes/country-proﬁles/npl_en.pdf?ua51.

®

